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Abstract: A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games 
and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative 
nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on 
relationships and supposed relationships between players. A relationship is a 
numerical value that denotes how one player cares for the payoffs of another player, 
while a supposed relationship is another numerical value that denotes a player’s belief 
about the relationship between two players. The players choose their strategies by 
taking into consideration not only the material payoffs but also relationships and their 
change. Two games, a prisoner’s dilemma and a repeated ultimatum game, are 
analyzed as examples of application of this model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There have been two kinds of researches in game theory: cooperative games theory 
pioneered by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) and non-cooperative games 
theory developed by Nash (1951). When analyzing a game, one first needs to confirm 
what type the game is because absolutely different methods will be used for two types 
of games. Methods for non-cooperative games are based on Nash equilibrium, various 
perfects of Nash equilibrium (e.g., Strong Nash Equilibrium by Aumann (1959), 
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium and Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium by 
Selten (1965, 1975), Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Strict Nash Equilibrium by 
Harsanyi (1967, 1973)) and the folk theorems, while cooperative games are analyzed 
by means of coalitions, core and Shapley value (Shapley (1953)). The most important 
work comes from non-cooperative analysis, although some scholars regain interest in 
cooperative games recently. 
A question is whether or not any games can be just categorized into these two types? 
Consider contract bridge, the card game that is played by four players in two 
competing partnerships. This game is neither cooperative nor non-cooperative 
because the relations between individual players are not identical. There are both 
cooperation between partners and competition between two partnerships. 
The players in a non-cooperative game only care for their own payoffs whilst the 
players in a cooperative game care for the payoffs of other players in the coalition as 
equally important as their own payoffs. If we use a numerical value to denote how 
much one player cares for another player’s payoff, this value will be zero for non- 
cooperative games and one for cooperative games. One may naturally ask what if this 
value is set to be neither zero nor one.  
In this paper, we introduce the concepts of relationship and supposed relationship. 
A relationship is a numerical value denoting how much one player cares for another 
player’s payoff. A supposed relationship is a numerical value denoting a player’s 
belief about how much one player cares for another player’s payoff. Relationships and 
supposed relationships are determined by the players, and they are changeable in 
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different stages of games. We propose a relationship model of games, in which 
strategic interaction among players is determined by the material payoffs, 
relationships and the players’ beliefs about relationships. Cooperative games and non-
cooperative games, as well as those games that are neither cooperative nor non-
cooperative can be expressed and analyzed by using this model. 
Interpersonal relationship has not attracted interests of research in game theory 
although it has long been an important topic of research in many social science 
disciplines such as psychology and politics (Kelley (2013), Heider (2013)). Game 
theorists take it for granted that the relationships between players are predetermined 
and they will never change during the strategic interactions of players.  
Interdependent preference, which denotes that a player’s preference depends on 
his/her opponent’s payoff as well as his/her own payoff, has been used to explain 
cooperation phenomena in experimental economics (e.g. Bolton 1991, 2000, Binmore 
et al. 2002, Ochs and Roth 1989, Samuelson 2001). It is quite similar to the 
relationship concept defined in this paper. Reputation effect pioneered by Kreps and 
Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) has been introduced into game theory 
to explain cooperation in repeated non-cooperative games. Relationship is obviously 
different from reputation in that reputation is independent of the game model and then 
has less effect in one-shot games. Cooper et al. (1996) and Chan (2000) suggested that 
reputation was unnecessarily the unique factor leading to cooperation in either 
infinitely or finitely repeated games. 
In the rest of the paper, we introduce a novel game model taking into consideration 
the relationship and relationship change among players. We also show the application 
of our model in a large set of games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative.  
 
2. A Relationship Model 
 
Definition 1: For players i and j in a game, a relationship ijR  is a numerical value 
denoting how much player i cares for player j’s payoff. Specially, there is iiR =1.  
Player i’s attitude toward j is non-cooperative when ijR =0, and cooperative when 
ijR =1. We call it a sub-cooperative attitude when 0< ijR <1, a hostile attitude when 
ijR <0, and a dedicated attitude when ijR >1. Sub-cooperative attitude is common in 
interpersonal relationships. People do not assign equal weights to the payoffs of their 
own and that of others although they do care for the payoffs of others. One typical 
example of hostile attitude can be found in suicide terrorist attacks. The terrorists 
must have a hostile attitude towards the targeted government so that they would rather 
give up their lives in the attacks. Dedicated attitude can be found in special real world 
instances, for example, a parent’s attitude toward their children, a religious believer’s 
attitude toward their god.  
 
Definition 2: For players i, j and k in a game, a supposed relationship ijk R  is a 
numerical value denoting how much player k thinks player i cares for player j’s payoff. 
Specially, there is iik R =1. 
Player k thinks that player i’s attitude toward j is non-cooperative when ijk R =0, 
cooperative when ijk R =1, sub-cooperative when 0< ijk R <1, hostile when ijk R <0, or 
dedicated when ijk R >1. In a game with complete information, there are ijR = ijk R , 
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which means that the relationships between players are known to all players. However, 
in a game with incomplete information, a supposed relationship is not necessarily 
equivalent to the corresponding relationship. 
Obviously cooperative and non-cooperative games are the special cases in the set of 
games defined by different values of ][ ijR  and ][ ijk R . For example, a game is non-
cooperative when ijR = ijk R =0 for any ji   and k, while a game is cooperative when 
ijR = ijk R =1 for any i, j and k. 
Note that }{ ijR  can be considered as a subset of }{ ijk R  because every player knows 
his/her own relationship and thus there must be ijiji RR  . We keep both variables in 
this paper to distinguish a relationship from other player’s belief about it. 
 
Definition 3: The relationship model of an n-player game G  is a 4-tuple, 
},,,{ RUSIG  , where I = },,1{ n  is the player set, S = },,{ 1 nSS   is the strategy 
set, U  is the payoff set, and R  is the supposed relationship set.  
 
Definition 4: A supposed payoff of player i, ji u , denotes how much player i thinks 
player j’s payoff is by taking player i’s supposed relationships into consideration.  
Given a strategy profile ),,( 1 nss  , player j’s payoff ),,( 1 nj ssu  , and player i’s 
supposed relationships }{ Ri , the supposed payoff, ji u , is computed by 
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Under the relationship model, the players in a game choose their strategies 
according to their supposed payoffs. For example, player i’s choice is determined by 
i’s supposed payoffs, ][ ui . We prove in the following theorem that there must exist at 
least one Nash equilibrium for every game when players make choices according to 
their supposed payoffs. 
 
Theorem 1: Under relationship model, there must exist a Nash equilibrium for every 
game.  
Proof: Consider an arbitrary player i in an n-player game ( Ni ). Let ][ ui  denote i’s 
supposed payoffs. Since ][ ui  is a complete payoff matrix, there must be a Nash 
equilibrium strategy profile for ][ ui , as Nash proved in [4]. Let is  be player i’s 
strategy in this profile. The strategies of all players form a new strategy profile 
}{ is , },,1{ ni  . It is obvious that }{ is  is a Nash equilibrium because every player i 
has no incentive to deviate from is .   
 
Let’s analyze the prisoner’s dilemma as an example to show how to use the 
relationship model of games. The payoff matrix of a prisoner’s dilemma is shown in 
Fig.1.  
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  y Player  
  C D 
x Player  
C 3, 3 0, 5 
D 5, 0 1, 1 
Figure 1 Two players choose between Cooperate (C) and Defect (D) in the prisoner’s dilemma. The 
numbers in each cell denote the payoffs of players x and y respectively.  
 
Let xyR  and yxR  denote the relationships between the players x and y, and xyy R  and 
yxx R  the corresponding supposed relationships of y and x. The supposed payoffs of 
player x can be computed according to (1). They are expressed as a matrix as shown 
in Fig. 2. 
 
  y Player  
  C D 
x Player  
C 3+3 xyR , 3+3 yxx R  5 xyR , 5 
D 5, 5 yxx R  1+ xyR , 1+ yxx R  
Figure 2 The supposed payoffs of player x.  
 
What player x chooses between C and D depends on the values of xyR  and yxx R . 
Choosing C is the dominant for player x when there are both 533  xyR  and 
xyxy RR 15 , or 3
2xyR . Strategy D is dominant when there are both 533  xyR  
and xyxy RR 15 , or 4
1xyR . In the case of 3
2
4
1  xyR , C is dominant when 
4
1yxx R  and D is dominant when 3
2yxx R . No strategy is dominant for player x 
when there are 
3
2
4
1 ,  yxxxy RR . 
Similarly, the supposed payoffs of player y are computed and expressed as a matrix 
as shown in Fig. 3, 
 
  y Player  
  C D 
x Player  
C 3+3 xyy R , 3+3 yxR  5 xyy R , 5 
D 5, 5 yxR  1+ xyy R , 1+ yxR  
Figure 3 The supposed payoffs of player y.  
 
Comparing Fig. 3 with Fig. 2, the supposed payoffs of two players will be identical 
if xyy R  and yxR  are replaced by xyR  and yxx R . C is the dominant strategy for player y 
when 
3
2yxR , while D is dominant when 4
1yxR . In the case of 3
2
4
1  yxR , C is 
dominant when 
4
1xyy R  while D is dominant when 3
2xyy R . No strategy is dominant 
when there are 
3
2
4
1 ,  xyyyx RR . 
If we consider the prisoner’s dilemma as a game of complete information, there 
should be xyR = xyy R  and yxR = yxx R , which means that the relationships are known to 
both players. The supposed payoffs of different players are identical in a game of 
complete information. The players’ choices depend on the exact values of xyR  and 
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yxR . For example, the strategy profile (C, C) is dominant when 3
2xyR  and 3
2yxR ; 
(D, D) is dominant when 
4
1xyR  and 4
1yxR ; (C, D) is dominant when 3
2xyR  and 
4
1yxR ; and (D, C) is dominant when 4
1xyR  and 3
2yxR . The game has multiple 
equilibria and no strategy profile is dominant when there are 
3
2
4
1 ,  xyyx RR . 
The strategy interaction in a game of incomplete information can be much diverse 
and complex because the relationships of one player are unknown to others. The 
supposed relationships are not necessarily equivalent to the corresponding 
relationship in a game of incomplete information. Since the supposed relationships are 
private information, the players would take advantage of them in strategic interactions. 
For example, player i attempts to exploit the opponent by setting ijR < jii R . On the 
other hand, ijR > jii R  reflects an altruistic attitude of player i toward j. There should be 
ijR = jii R  if player i adopts a tit-for-tat strategy, or in other words, player i wants to 
treat the opponent exactly same as what the opponent treats themselves. 
If we consider the prisoner’s dilemma as a game of incomplete information, 
equilibrium analysis can be made given the values of xyR , yxR , xyy R , and yxx R . 
Suppose that there are xyR = yxR 3
1  and xyy R  = yxx R 5
1 , the supposed payoffs can 
be computed as shown in Fig. 4. From Fig. 4(a), D is dominant strategy for player y. 
Player x will choose C given that he/she believes that the other player will choose D. 
Similarly, from Fig. 4(b), player y will also choose C given that he/she thinks the 
opponent would choose D. Thus, strategy profile (C, C) will be the outcome. In this 
scenario, both players have an altruistic attitude towards another player and thus they 
would choose C in order to maximize the other player’s payoff.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 (a) Supposed payoffs of player x. (b) Supposed payoffs of player y. 
 
 
3. Repeated games 
 
A repeated game TG  is a 4-tuple, },,,{ TRUSIG  , where T  is the number of 
iteration. The players in a repeated game will have to take relationship change into 
consideration when choosing their strategies. Relationship change reflects the 
complexity of intelligent decision making. It could be a complex action depending on 
how the players retrieve information from previous interactions with other players and 
how they update their supposed relationships. 
One reason for relationship change in repeated games lies in the fact that previous 
strategic interactions provide new information about relationships so that the players 
should update their supposed relationships. Take the iterated prisoner’s dilemma as an 
  y Player  
  C D 
x Player  
C 4, 3
5
3  1
3
2 , 5 
D 5, 1 1
3
1 , 1
5
1  
(a) 
  y Player  
  C D 
x Player  
C 3
5
3 , 4 1, 5 
D 5, 1
3
2  1
5
1 , 1
3
1  
(b) 
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example. Suppose that two players play the prisoner’s dilemma with payoff matrix as 
shown in Fig. 1 repeatedly, and there are xyR = yxR 3
1  and xyy R  = yxx R 5
1  at the 
beginning of game. According to two players’ supposed payoffs shown in Fig. 4, they 
choose (C, C) in the first round. After playing the first round, two players realize that 
they have underestimated xyy R  and yxx R because the other player should have chosen 
D instead of C according to their original evaluations of xyy R  and yxx R . Two players 
should then increase their supposed relationships to some values greater than 
4
1 .  
Relationship change may take place in games of complete information as well. 
Assume that there are xyR yxR  in the above example. A tit-for-tat player will update 
his/her relationship to make sure xyR yxR . 
In the following example we analyze a repeated ultimatum game in order to show 
how players take into consideration relationship change in game playing.  
Let’s consider an infinitely repeated ultimatum game. In each round, Row player 
proposes an offer of dividing one dollar between two players. If Column player 
accepts the offer, they receive the corresponding share. Otherwise, both players 
receive nothing. The minimum division of one dollar is one cent. Fig. 5 shows the 
payoff matrix of this game. The supposed payoffs of Column player are shown in Fig. 
6. 
 
  Column player 
  Accept Reject 
Row 
player 
0 1, 0 0, 0 
0.01 0.99, 0.01 0, 0 
… … 0, 0 
α 1-α, α 0, 0 
… … 0, 0 
0.99 0.01, 0.99 0, 0 
 
Figure 5 An ultimatum game in which Row player makes an offer of dividing a dollar to Column 
player. 
 
  Column player 
  Accept Reject 
Row 
player 
0 1, 0 0, 0 
… … 0, 0 
α  1 RCC R , )1(   CRR  0, 0 
… … 0, 0 
 
Figure 6 The supposed payoffs of Column player. 
 
The supposed payoffs of two players can be computed according to the 
relationships and supposed relationships of RCR , CRR , CRR R , and RCC R . For an offer  , 
Row player’s supposed payoff profile is (  1 RCR , )1(   CRR R ) while 
Column player’s supposed payoff profile is (  1 RCC R , )1(   CRR ).  
In order for Column player to accept  , there must be )1(   CRR >0, or 
CR
CR
R
R


1
 . On the other hand, for Row player there must be  1 RCR >0, or 

 RCR1
1 . Taking into consideration the supposed relationships of two players, Row 
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player will offer   satisfying 
 RCR1
1
CRR
CRR
R
R


1
 and Column player will accept  
satisfying 
 RCC R1
1
CR
CR
R
R



1
.  
When CRR R 0 , Row player thinks Column player would accept any offer  >0 so 
Row player would offer  =0.01 to maximize the payoff. This is what non-
cooperative game theory has predicted. However, Column player could choose CRR <0 
and would definitely reject the offer of  =0.01. In an infinitely repeated game, two 
players will reach an agreement with the offer in range of 
 RCR1
1
CR
CR
R
R



1
 even if two 
players cannot communicate with each other. Consider the case of RCR = CRR CRRR  
5.0 RCC R . Column player would reject any offer with 3
1 , which transferred 
the information about Column player’s relationship value to Row player. Row player 
would then have to increase the offer in order to make an agreement. From a sequence 
of offering and rejecting, they could infer the relationship values of the other side. 
This process is similar to a two-player bargaining game in which rational players will 
reach an agreement with 
3
1
3
2   in the bargaining. 
How players choose relationships to maximize payoffs can be a complex problem 
because it depends on their knowledge, experience, and strategic interactions in the 
game. Consider Column player in the above game as an example. Column player 
would set CRR  to the value so that  RCC R1
1
CR
CR
R
R


1
, in which case Column player’s payoff 
would be maximized if an agreement could be made. Given that 5.0RCC R , there 
will be 2CRR . Column player would reject any offer with 3
2  hoping that Row 
player would offer 
3
2  in the next round. On the other hand, Row player would 
choose 2RCR  and would not offer any 3
1 . As a consequence, no agreement 
could be reach. Realized that consequence, two players have to make concessions by 
choosing reasonable values of relationships, i.e. 25.0  CRR  and 25.0  RCR .  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
A generalized model of games that takes into consideration the relationships 
between players is proposed. Cooperative games and non-cooperative games are the 
special case of this model. There exists a significant set of games that are neither 
cooperative nor non-cooperative, which have not been investigated in game theory 
before. 
We prove that there must exist a Nash equilibrium for every game under the 
relationship model so that equilibrium analysis developed in non-cooperative game 
theory can be applied. A prisoner’s dilemma and a repeated ultimatum game are 
analyzed as applications of the relationship model.  
One advantage of the relationship model lies in that it provides an accurate 
description of the players’ attitudes toward others in game playing. Apart from 
cooperative and non-cooperative, a player’s attitude toward another player could be 
sub-cooperative, hostile and dedicated. By taking supposed relationships into account, 
the attitudes of altruism and exploitation can be considered. Relationships and 
relationship changes make the strategies of players interdependent. Our future work 
will address the challenging issue of how the players take advantage of the 
relationships and the corresponding relationship changes.  
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